Standing

Art. III standing

In Griswold the appellants were found guilty against the claim that the accessory statute as so applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Here those doubts about standing  are removed by reason of a criminal conviction. Certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime. Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 481(1965),     

The physician appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. They should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62  (1976) > Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 1973

[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555, 560   (1992)

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical,'"

Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, ..." > [426 U.S. 26, 41,42];

Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." > [426 U.S. 26, 38,43]

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welf. Rights. Org. 426 U.S. 26 (1976)

The common thread underlying both requirements is that a person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless he shows that he himself is injured by its operation.  ''an invasion of a legally-protected interest,'' Barrows v. Jackson 346 U.S. 249,255-56 (1953)

The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923)

His "interest must be of a personal and not of an official nature." ………..The interest must not be wholly negligible, as that of a taxpayer of the Federal Government is considered to be, ……. A litigant must show more than that "he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Anti -Fascist Committee v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951).